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 Introduction
Improvements in global telecommunications and transport networks, 
combined with increasingly liberalized global trading regimes, have 
enabled the rise of a new class of start-ups that span international borders 
at birth. However, in spite of the research attention on this phenomenon, 
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the raison d’être and effects of economic and socio-cultural factors on 
these international new ventures are still not well understood (e.g., 
Kandasaami, 1998; Zahra, 2005). A similar general observation can be 
made on our understanding of new venture survival and evolution in 
general, despite several decades of research (Phan, 2004).
Oviatt and McDougall (1994), in their seminal article, define an inter-
national new venture as a business organization that, from inception, 
seeks to derive significant competitive advantage from the use of resources 
from and the sale of outputs to multiple countries. The growing literature 
on these so-called ‘born-international’ (or ‘born-global’) firms (e.g., 
Hedlund & Kverneland, 1985; Rialp, Rialp, & Knight, 2005) positions 
itself in contrast to the more established, staged-internationalization lit-
erature of Hymer (1960, 1968), Johanson and Vahlne (1977, 1990) and 
others (e.g., Dunning, 1988; Melin, 1992).
Many scholars have concentrated on portraying these international 
new ventures as an entirely different breed of firms, which defy cultural 
and socio-institutional constraints faced by the more traditional, staged- 
internationalizing companies (e.g., Ganitsky, 1989; Hedlund & 
Kverneland, 1985; McKinsey and Co., 1993). In the former view, firms 
start up internationally or focus on international markets shortly after 
inception, bypassing the maturing process that accompanies domestic 
development. In the latter view, firms adopt an international strategy as 
a result of a sequential process (also known as the Uppsala model of 
staged internationalization) that begins with building markets and capa-
bilities at home before venturing abroad (Chang, 1995; Johanson & 
Vahlne, 1977).
Instead of treating international new ventures as a distinct breed of 
firm, we investigate in this paper whether they are influenced by the same 
economic factors in their early internationalization decisions as the 
staged-internationalizing firms, and the extent to which these interna-
tional new ventures are still subject to the influence of cultural distance 
when their specific business decisions involve the mass market.1 Based on 
suggestions by Oviatt and McDougall (1994), we conducted a census of 
firms in a technologically homogenized industry over a wide geographical 
area, and model their internationalization decision at inception. Most 
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importantly, we include both the early-internationalizing firms and their 
counterparts in the same industry and country who chose not to interna-
tionalize early.
Our contribution to this literature is threefold. First, we demonstrate 
that economic factors play a significant role in influencing firms to inter-
nationalize early (or not): early internationalization may in fact represent 
the profit-maximizing strategic path for some firms. This point has only 
been suggested and not empirically supported in the ‘born-global’ litera-
ture. While our data do not go so far as to confirm that many ‘born- 
global’ firms may in fact have been forced to go global owing to the 
relative lack of more profitable opportunities elsewhere, such anecdotal 
comments would certainly be consistent with the findings in this paper. 
Second, our empirical analyses suggest that even early-internationalizing 
firms may be subject to the same socio-cultural influences in allocating 
their production capacities to international markets when their products 
are designed to cater for the mass markets. In other words, the cultural- 
distance defying character of born-globals may be more limited in reality 
than previously portrayed in the literature. Third, our analysis demon-
strates that the decision by firms to internationalize early or not should be 
considered jointly with the capacity allocation decision (for international 
markets). In other words, analyzing these separately, or including only 
the early-internationalizing firms in the sample, may lead to biased inter-
pretations of the motivation behind these decisions.
In spite of the explicit allowance for different forms of international-
ization (e.g., those with an international component as part of the value 
chain as opposed to mere exports) in Oviatt and McDougall (1994), a 
vast majority of the literature on international new ventures still focusses 
on export sales. In this paper, an explicit allocation of capacity for inter-
national sales can be clearly measured, whereas the inclusion of an inter-
nationalized value chain is less obvious. We therefore restrict our view of 
‘international’ new ventures to those that allocate an observable produc-
tion capacity for potential international sales.
We next develop our hypotheses with regard to new ventures that 
internationalize at their inaugural production. We define new ventures 
as independently operated and marketed corporate entities that have no 
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prior corporate history in the industry, and hence no prior market 
 presence. In other words, a restructured company with a brand new 
corporate identity, a merged entity of several companies or a divested 
subsidiary is not considered a new venture. Also, a new company that 
relies on another company for its marketing and/or other key corporate 
functions (e.g., a subcontractor, private-label manufacturer, etc.) is not 
included here. We focus primarily on de novo ventures where the parent 
company (if any) has no experience in the same industry as the ventures 
themselves, but do include a handful of diversifying ventures where the 
parent company is starting a new, independently operated and marketed 
entity in the same industry.
 International New Ventures
In contrast to those firms described in the Uppsala internationalization 
model (e.g., Johanson & Vahlne, 1977; Johanson & Wiedersheim-Paul, 
1975), where the internationalization process is incremental, the litera-
ture on international new ventures focusses on firms whose internation-
alization process occurs early in their history and represents a significant 
part of their operational capacity (e.g., Knight & Cavusgil, 1996; Oviatt 
& McDougall, 1994; Rennie, 1993). The early and significant interna-
tionalization process of these new ventures is at odds with the notion of 
‘cultural distance’ in the international business literature – which gener-
ally translates into higher entry barriers or uncertainties for entering cul-
turally distant societies relative to the home country of the focal firm 
(e.g., Hofstede, 1980; Kogut & Singh, 1988).
The cultural-distance-defying character of the international new ven-
ture has attracted the attention of scholars such as Hedlund and 
Kverneland (1985), Ganitsky (1989) and McKinsey and Co. (1993), 
who focussed largely on confirming the existence and characteristics of 
such firms. In particular, many scholars have been keen to delineate the 
differences between this type of firm and the staged-internationalizing 
firm. One perspective concentrates on the founding management and 
learning capacity of the organization. Some suggest that the experience 
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and exposure of the managers prior to the start of a new venture play a 
part in its early internationalization decision (e.g., Busenitz & Barney, 
1997; Harveston, Kedia, & Davis, 2000; Madsen & Servais, 1997; 
Shrader, Oviatt, & McDougall, 2000), whereas others suggest that the 
fast-paced learning of these resource-constrained, technology-oriented 
firms allows them the early internationalization opportunity (e.g., 
Knight & Cavusgil, 2004; Zahra & George, 2002). In other words, the 
prior exposure of the founding managers or the inherent learning 
capacity of these firms reduces the uncertainty and/or cost of pursuing 
specific business opportunities abroad. It is this uncertainty, or the cost 
reduction potential, of these international business opportunities that 
makes them more promising to a new venture than the domestic home 
market. Hence the fast-internationalizing strategy can be survivalen-
hancing or even represent the profit-maximizing path for some firms. 
This perspective, we emphasize, is entirely consistent with the rational 
and profit-maximizing nature of the firm, a point that has not been 
emphasized in the international new ventures literature. Meanwhile, as 
the world becomes increasingly integrated, an increasing proportion of 
individuals will be aware of international business opportunities – but 
this will still likely not make all companies in the distant future 
born-globals.
Another stream of work arguing for the uniqueness of international 
new ventures is related to their business models. Many international new 
ventures are found to be involved in advanced, niche technologies or 
knowledge-intensive industries (e.g., Autio, Sapienza, & Almeida, 2000; 
Bell, 1995; Jolly, Alahuta, & Jeannet, 1992; Young, 1987). Implicit in 
this perspective is that dispersed customers and suppliers specializing in a 
niche technology in different countries can more easily understand (and 
trade with) each other than customers and suppliers in non-specialized, 
mass markets – the result of the latter being the traditional fragmentation 
of markets based on culture and geography. In other words, the cultural 
distance that impedes the conduct of business involving the general pop-
ulace is overcome by the ‘domain-specific familiarity’ among specialists. 
It is then easier for those individuals with such knowledge to transact 
across geographic boundaries with their specialized counterparts 
 International New Ventures: Revisiting the Influences… 
136 
 elsewhere. Thus, depending on the specific nature of the business, new 
ventures are likely subject to the influences of some combination of 
domain-specific familiarity and cultural distance when it comes to the 
internationalization decision.2
By combining these two perspectives, we can avoid having to make an 
a priori characterization of the international new venture as a distinct 
breed of firm. The possibility that international new ventures can in fact 
be quite similar to staged-internationalizing firms has been raised by 
Madsen and Servais (1997), who commented on the fact that, while the 
definition of fast-internationalizing firms relies on the official date of 
inception, the founding managers of international new ventures could 
have been exposed to international opportunities long before this date. In 
other words, the distinction between early/fast internationalizing and 
staged internationalizing can be blurred when this point is taken into 
account.
The similarities between international new ventures and traditional, 
staged-internationalizing firms were highlighted in a comparative 
study of over 100 companies in Australia by Kandasaami and Huang 
(2000). This study found little difference in product uniqueness, 
t echnological sophistication, degree of customization or pricing 
advantages between these two groups (relative to their respective com-
petitors). Madsen, Rasmussen, and Servais (2000) reported broadly 
consistent results.
These similarities between the supposedly distinct breeds of firm raise 
an interesting question: Why do some firms choose to stay domestic 
when they could easily have gone international at birth? In an attempt to 
answer at least part of this question, we include in our analysis both born- 
global firms and those that could have but chose not to.
As discussed later in the paper, constraints in our data from the intra- 
European airline industry lead us to define born-global firms based on 
the production capacity allocated for potential international sales. In this 
paper, we define a born-global firm as one that allocates at least 20% of 
its inaugural production capacity to international markets at inception. 
This definition, as we will demonstrate later in the paper, is broadly in 
line with others in the literature.
T. Fan and P. Phan
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 Economic Drivers of the ‘Born-Global’ Firm
In Kandasaami’s (1998) review of the literature, two streams of economic 
drivers for internationalization can be traced to (1) environmental factors 
and (2) firm characteristics. With respect to environmental factors, the 
primary drivers relate to the size of the domestic market of the focal firm 
vis-à-vis the potential of the international market (as suggested by others, 
including: Ganitsky, 1989; Hedlund & Kverneland, 1985; Knight & 
Cavusgil, 1996), and the relative ease of access to the latter markets. This 
leads us to Hypothesis 1:
Hypothesis 1: Everything else equal, the larger the size of the home 
country market, the less likely it is that a new venture will choose to go 
international at inception.
Hypothesis 1 says that a new venture needs to trade off the cost of 
entering foreign markets against that of accessing its home country mar-
ket. If the home country market is sufficiently large (and accessible) com-
pared with the foreign markets, chances are that new ventures will be 
more likely to stay within the home market at inception.
From the perspective of access to markets, large urban centres3 are 
likely to have better access to the rest of the home country’s market 
through better transport (e.g., highways, railroads) and communication 
links than small provincial towns, and those new ventures operating out 
of the large urban centres can benefit from such infrastructure. Such firms 
can quickly acquire efficient economic scale in their home urban centres 
and go after the rest of the home country, and then the international, 
market. The large urban centres are also more likely to be cosmopolitan 
than their provincial counterparts. All these factors increase the likeli-
hood that those new ventures operating out of large urban centres will 
internationalize early compared with those operating out of small provin-
cial towns. We therefore include two control variables in our model: the 
population of the city where a new venture is based, and the population 
share of this city relative to the population of the entire home market (to 
control for the ‘centrality’ of such urban centres in its country).
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Another important economic driver concerns the production capacity 
of the new venture. If a venture is severely constrained in terms of its 
initial resources relative to its home country market, then the new ven-
ture can serve the market only in its immediate vicinity.4 This is more 
likely for firms located in the smaller provincial towns of its home coun-
try, because the cost of capital in such areas has been shown to be higher 
(Coval & Moskowitz, 2001; Grinblatt & Keloharju, 2001). If this inau-
gural capacity is significantly larger than the profit-maximizing demand 
in the home country market (i.e., minimum efficient scale translated into 
excess capacity), it makes sense for the firm to venture internationally at 
inception (McKinsey and Co., 1993; Rennie, 1993). Therefore our sec-
ond hypothesis states that:
Hypothesis 2: Everything else equal, the larger the inaugural capacity of 
a new venture, the more likely it will be to choose to go international at 
inception.
 Economic Determinants of Capacity Allocation
Once a new venture decides to internationalize  – more specifically, to 
export – it needs to allocate production capacity to a set of international 
targets. Since we are not able to explicitly survey entrepreneurs’ perceived 
opportunities, we rely on the observed outcome of the entry decision to 
indicate the relative attractiveness of the various international markets. It is 
implicit in this assumption that entrepreneurs, as profit-maximizers, would 
not accept an opportunity if a more attractive alternative presented itself.
Businesses are generally attracted to markets with historically high 
demand, largely because in these markets even those customers diverted 
from incumbent competitors could represent a considerable business vol-
ume. In the context of international business, given the relatively fixed cost 
associated with adapting a product to the local taste of a foreign country, 
the venture in a country with a larger demand market can spread this cost 
over a greater volume. Given a sufficiently large inaugural production 
capacity, a new venture would understandably be attracted to markets with 
demonstrated large demand if it chose to go international at inception:
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Hypothesis 3: Everything else equal, the larger the size of an established 
market, the greater the inaugural production capacity an international 
new venture will allocate to it.
The ceteris paribus assumption behind Hypothesis 3 is particularly 
important from the perspective of a profit-maximizer, since any two mar-
kets with identical historical demand may involve starkly different levels 
of competition – with immediate impact on the profitability of entering 
these markets and hence on the production capacity allocated to them. 
Classical economic theory suggests that the number of competitors and 
the degree of rivalry in a particular market impact on the prices offered to 
customers (and hence profits to the firms). The effect of interfirm compe-
tition is also acknowledged in technology-intensive business environ-
ments (e.g., Zahra, 1996). While the number of competitors is easily 
observed, the degree of rivalry is more difficult. For simplicity, we rely on 
the former with respect to a new venture considering internationalizing 
at inception:
Hypothesis 4a: Everything else equal, the larger the number of incum-
bent competitors in a market, the lower the inaugural production capac-
ity an international new venture will allocate to it.
 Cultural and Socio-institutional Determinants 
of Capacity Allocation
Earlier, we reasoned that, while ‘domain-specific familiarity’ dominates 
when business transactions involve specialized knowledge and revolve 
around those individuals with such knowledge, the traditional socio- 
institutional determinants of a market entry decision should still domi-
nate when business activities involve individuals with non-specialized 
knowledge. Here, we draw our insights from the organizational and 
international business literature.
According to Stinchcombe (1965), a liability of newness attends young 
organizations because they have not yet established the social accep-
tance (legitimacy) required for stakeholders to support their survival by 
conferring resources. Originating from both customers and suppliers, 
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there is enormous pressure for new ventures to quickly establish legiti-
macy through their market entry decisions, or face sanctions from actors 
in the organizational field (e.g., Meyer & Rowan, 1977).
The liability of newness is particularly salient where the norms and 
cognitive structures for the shared interpretation of meaning have been 
institutionalized. In other words, when new ventures enter a market that 
has already been institutionalized, they face greater pressures to engage in 
isomorphic behaviours on market entry (e.g., Greve, 1998; Haveman, 
1993) – that is, copying the market entry behaviour of incumbents. In 
the eyes of potential customers (and suppliers) in the general populace, 
the isomorphic market entries vis-à-vis established incumbents help new 
ventures gain legitimacy and increase acceptance.
In the literature on isomorphism, the rate of market entry was demon-
strated to be increasing at a decreasing rate as a function of the number 
of incumbents5 (i.e., the ‘inverted-U’ shape described in Haveman, 
19936). In our paper, we are concerned not so much with entry rates, but 
rather with the proportion of inaugural production capacity allocated to 
international markets. Since we do not find another hypothesis in the 
literature with closer relevance to ours than this, we hypothesize that a 
similar relationship on capacity allocation can be expected from the new 
industry entrants:
Hypothesis 4b: Everything else constant, an international new venture 
will allocate more capacity to a market with more incumbents than to 
one with fewer incumbents, but this increase in capacity allocation will 
decrease as the number of established incumbents increases (i.e., an 
inverted-U shape).
Hypotheses 4a and 4b act in opposite directions with regard to the 
number of incumbent competitors in a market.
Once a new venture decides to go international, and appeals to the gen-
eral market for its products, it will be exposed to traditional international 
business pressures. The literature is replete with studies on how cross-bor-
der business transactions can incur different sets of costs compared with 
those taking place domestically (e.g., Eden & Miller, 2004; Zaheer & 
Mosakowski, 1997). While some of these costs and opportunities may 
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stem from the different political and economic structure of the foreign 
countries involved, many of them can be traced to the efforts expended to 
understand and adapt the business to the cultural norms and value systems 
that prevail in a particular country (Erez & Earley, 1993; Hofstede, 1980). 
For example, variations in educational qualifications, religious observances 
and languages may increase the costs of human resource management for 
firms that enter a foreign country (Schwartz, 1999).
The perceived costs associated with entering a market with different 
cultural and/or socio-institutional settings could result in a new venture 
being more cautious in entering international markets, leading us to 
Hypotheses 5a and 5b:
Hypothesis 5a: Given the same size of an established market, the 
amount of production capacity allocated to culturally distant countries 
will be less than the amount of production capacity allocated to culturally 
similar countries.
Hypothesis 5b: Given the same number of incumbents in an estab-
lished market, the amount of production capacity allocated to culturally 
distant countries will be less than the amount of production capacity 
allocated to culturally similar countries.
We loosely use the term ‘cultural distance’ here to describe whether the 
cultural and socio-institutional norms in different regions or countries are 
similar. This concept has been widely used among researchers in studies 
in the international business area (e.g., Kogut & Singh, 1988). We dis-
cuss the implementation issues for cultural similarity later.
 Methods
 Data
An important component of this study concerns the decision of new 
ventures to stay at home or go international at birth. We therefore need 
data from an industry with examples of firms that have done both at 
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launch, in addition to the associated market entry information. In order 
to control for endogeneity, we also need an industry in which technologi-
cal change is held relatively constant across the firms because product 
innovators are likely to face a different set of competitors and constella-
tion of complementary products.7 As a result of these concerns, we draw 
our data from the intra-European scheduled passenger airline industry – 
one in which new ventures can be international or domestic at inception, 
and with a product that appeals to the general populace.
In this industry, a series of deregulatory moves have turned the 
European Union (EU) into a single air transport market and so have 
reduced systematic bias from country-level differences in air travel regu-
lations. The fact that airlines rely on the general populace for their busi-
ness bears resemblance to other products such as mobile telephones, 
hearing implants and desktop computer aids that have produced ‘born- 
global’ firms reported in the literature (Jolly et al., 1992; McKinsey and 
Co., 1993).
Prior to the latest wave of liberalization, the entry and exit, capacity, 
frequency and pricing decisions on each route (or city-pair market) in the 
industry were highly regulated by the governments of the European 
Common Market. On international routes within Europe, revenue pool-
ing and sharing agreements between designated flag-carriers were com-
mon, which effectively limited price competition while encouraging 
non-price competition in services. Within each country, similar regula-
tion meant that traditional flag-carriers enjoyed market dominance in a 
protected environment.
In 1993 the final package of liberalization measures was introduced, 
in which full pricing freedom throughout all intra-European markets 
was granted. The same package allowed airlines of an EU member coun-
try to fly any route between any two EU countries and, starting in 1997, 
any intra-EU country route, without requiring the airline to start or end 
the route in its home country. As a result of this liberalization, from 
about 1996 an increasing number of new entrants began offering air 
service in the single market. This sea change in the regulatory framework 
provided us with an opportunity to examine the inaugural market entry 
decisions of new ventures that were set up to take advantage of the liber-
alized industry environment.
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Our choice of the intra-European airline industry has several advan-
tages. First, the historical lack of pure connecting hubs (with little local 
originating and destination traffic) within the European continent and 
the higher prevalence of non-stop intercity air service in Europe mean 
that passengers in general are less likely to have to make a connection or 
even a same-plane en route stop when travelling between moderately sized 
cities.8 The increasing prevalence of scheduled non-stop services operated 
by European carriers further increases the likelihood of passengers travel-
ling directly between any two cities (Fan, 2006).
Second, the traditionally national roots of many incumbent European 
carriers mean that intra-European route networks are slow to change. It 
is less likely that incumbents will drastically change their route structure 
just to compete with a small start-up (the additions or removals of a con-
necting hub by a US carrier, in contrast, may impact on many city-pair 
markets in a relatively short period of time). Indeed, our survey of the 
authoritative industry publication Official Airline Guide (OAG) reveals 
very few route changes by incumbents that can be traced to the emer-
gence of a new carrier.
Third, there is reasonable variation in socio-institutional and cultural 
norms within Europe, which from a statistical standpoint improves the 
robustness of the measurement model. So even though English is the 
operational language in the aviation industry, airlines need to adapt their 
marketing and service offerings to customers with different cultural 
mores. For example, the forms and language of advertising are likely to be 
specific to the host country region; the degree of reliance through differ-
ent sales intermediaries (e.g., travel agencies, packaged tour agencies) is 
also different across Europe. In fact, the fare levels and conditions, distri-
bution practices (e.g., direct or via third parties) and marketing  campaigns 
for the same airline often exhibit marked differences from one country to 
another (Fan & Leung, 2005).
To isolate the impact of established business ties and the associated 
information advantage enjoyed by incumbents, we choose to focus on air 
carriers that began scheduled passenger service as independent marketing 
and operating firms during the deregulated era.9 This eliminates former 
and existing regional affiliates of major carriers from our study. The OAG, 
or formerly the ABC Airline Guide in parts of the world, contains a 
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detailed account of passenger flight schedules. We take a week’s worth of 
schedule every quarter (February, May, August and November) from 
1996 to mid-2004 from the OAG, and obtain a list of new carriers (those 
with no operations in the previous quarter) formed within this period. 
This period captured two peaks in terms of new airline entry activities: 
one in early 1997 (up to eight new entries in Quarter 1), coinciding with 
the last package of liberalization, and in mid-2002 (up to 10 new entries 
in Quarter 2), after the new entrants had waited for the post-9/11 eco-
nomic outlook to clear.
For both incumbent and new airlines, the liberalization permitted 
instant freedom to expand broadly within the EU, subject to the opera-
tional constraints of local airports. While the primary airports serving 
major cities such as London and Frankfurt generally have few time slots 
available for new flights,10 secondary airports serving these cities tend to 
have plenty of capacity. More importantly, the naming of these second-
ary airports (e.g., London Stansted, Frankfurt Hahn) reveals the com-
petitive intent of the operating carriers and/or the aspirations of these 
airports to serve parts of the larger metropolitan area. Using this fact, we 
define a pair of cities (with each city consisting of all of its constituent 
airports) connected with scheduled non-stop passenger service as a unit 
of ‘market’.
Many of the new airlines compete with incumbents through a combi-
nation of lower prices (with minimal frills) and more convenient sched-
ules, regardless of whether or not they identify themselves as ‘low cost’ or 
discount carriers. Whereas some new carriers experimented with provid-
ing levels of in-flight service11 and distribution channels (e.g., more reli-
ance on direct sales via the Internet) that were different from those of the 
incumbents, these features were quickly incorporated by some of the 
 latter.12 In any case, the intra-European passenger air travel market con-
sists of flights no longer than 4 or 5 h in duration, with schedule conve-
nience and price likely to be strong determinants of passenger choice 
rather in- flight amenities.
Among the entrants in the study, 15 labelled themselves as ‘low-cost 
carriers’, but did not exhibit substantially different international market 
entry patterns than others. Among these 15 low-cost carriers, five were 
set up using funds from their incumbent parent, but were operated as 
T. Fan and P. Phan
 145
entirely independent entities. Removing these from the sample did not 
qualitatively change the results, and therefore they are included in the 
ensuing analysis.
We eliminated ventures that focussed on helicopter operations, and 
also those that had previously started operations but for some reason were 
not listed in the February 1996 issue of the OAG. We also eliminated 
those ventures that experienced a corporate change, such as a re-branding 
or re-launch under a new service concept (but retained the same airline 
code with the authoritative International Air Transport Association), and 
hence were not truly new ventures.
In our sample, several carriers operated intra-European flights primar-
ily as a continuation of intercontinental itineraries, and the low weekly 
frequencies indicated that their focus was on intercontinental rather than 
intra-European traffic: these were also dropped from the sample. Two 
carriers that were set up as national or territorial carriers (and thus were 
not necessarily profit-maximizing) were also dropped. This procedure 
resulted in 135 new entrants for further analysis. For these 135 new 
entrants, we collected all their market entry and capacity decisions 
between 1996 and 2004. Table 5.1 shows some of the descriptive statis-
tics for these carriers.
 Operationalization of International New Ventures
The seminal articles of Oviatt and McDougall (1994) and McDougall, 
Shane, and Oviatt (1994) provided a typology to understand interna-
tional new ventures according to their different degrees of international 
involvement: from mere market entries as exporters to having  international 
operations as part of a firm’s value chain. However, it is generally difficult 
to gauge the international involvement of a new venture other than 
export (e.g., sourcing from foreign suppliers). In fact, one of the earliest 
references to the term ‘born-global’ describes one such firm as one that 
‘[views] the world as [its] marketplace from the outset and [sees] domes-
tic market as a support for [its] international business’ (McKinsey and 
Co., 1993). Many scholars have since based their definitions of born- 
globals around export activities. Therefore the focus on export, or rather 
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some measure of export intensity (e.g., export sales as a proportion of 
total sales), alongside the speed of internationalization, has been used to 
define international new ventures.
In the McKinsey study on Australian exporters (1993), the so-called 
‘born-globals’ on average exported 75% of their total sales within 2 years 
of operation. Knight (1997) and Madsen et  al. (2000) define ‘born- 
globals’ as firms with at least 25% of their sales to foreign countries within 
3 years after their inception (after 1976). Kandasaami and Huang (2000) 
define ‘born-globals’ as firms that derive at least 10% of their total sales 
from international activities within the first 3 years of start-up.
In addition, some finer definitions have been suggested. Kandasaami 
(1998) suggests that a born-global firm should have business activities in 
at least five countries and 40% of export sales within the first 2 years of 
commercial sales, while a born-international firm can have business activ-
Table 5.1 Descriptive statistics of new carriers
Attributes Statistics
Total number of new ventures 135
  Started international service at birth 67
  Started international service to same-language countries 12
Capacity of new venture at birth (average seats per week) 2162
  Average weekly frequency 29
  Average flight distance (km) 607
Capacity of incumbents faced by each venture (average seats per 
week)
11,090
  Average weekly frequency 95
  Number of effective incumbents for each entrant (average, 
route-weighted, excluding entrants exclusively serving new routes)
3.5
Number of new ventures based in different countries
  Italy 25
  Germany 21
  United Kingdom 18
  Sweden 12
  France 11
  Spain 9
  Greece 7
  Netherlands 5
  Austria 4
  Finland 3
  Others 20
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ities in fewer than five countries. Lummaa (2002) suggests that the num-
ber of countries is not a sufficient definition for born-globals. Instead, a 
born-global firm should have business activities in at least two cultural 
clusters, as defined by Hofstede (1980), and geographical regions.
In our survey of new ventures of the European airline industry, it is 
difficult to ascertain the ratio of foreign to total sales, since virtually all of 
these firms are privately held at inception. It is also difficult to retrace 
their exact date of business registration, since a significant portion of 
them have ceased operations. However, we can calculate the production 
capacity (in terms of seat capacity per week) allocated by these new ven-
tures to international markets as a proxy and record when their opera-
tions commenced (i.e., commercial ‘production’). Among the 135 new 
carriers starting operation between 1997 and 2004, 67 – or just under 
half – operated international itineraries at inception. While all of these 
carriers are legally permitted to serve domestic routes in a foreign coun-
try, or international routes between two foreign countries (within the 
EU), only two carriers did so within our period of study, and these were 
probably the continuation of the same flight itineraries from their home 
countries. On the surface, this finding lends credence to the staged- 
internationalization conjecture, in which new ventures try to build a 
critical mass of operation around their home cities and countries first 
before expanding abroad.
Among our 135 new industry entrants, 67 of them launched interna-
tional service at their inauguration (of commercial production). All of 
these 67 carriers allocated at least 20% of their inaugural capacity to 
international markets, and 53 (or about 80%) of them allocated more 
than half their capacity to international markets at inception. Assuming 
that these 67 carriers derived only half of their business in their interna-
tional operations from ‘foreign’ customers, all of these carriers can be con-
sidered ‘born-globals’ (or at least ‘born-internationals’) by the definition 
of Kandasaami and Huang (2000), based on their proportion of foreign 
sales. In terms of their length of time to establish such a scale of interna-
tional operation, our ‘born-globals’ in fact meet an even stricter criterion, 
as their production for international sales is required right at their com-
mercial launch instead of within several years of initial sales. This means 
that, in spite of the slightly different definition for a ‘born- global’ firm in 
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this paper, the actual ‘born-global’ firms counted in our sample should be 
broadly similar to others in the literature based on different definitions. 
As such, we count all these 67 carriers as ‘born-globals’. While 67 consti-
tutes a significant proportion of our total population of 135 industry 
entrants, the number itself is still relatively small in terms of robust statis-
tical analysis. We keep this in mind when interpreting the results of the 
regression analysis.
The average city-pair market was served quite frequently by all the new 
carriers, with more than a daily flight even at the early stage of develop-
ment, indicating a significant focus on business rather than leisure travel-
lers. This pattern suggests that the passengers flying these carriers are less 
likely to be entirely of the vacationer type from the same home country, 
and these carriers needed to adapt their business practices to the poten-
tially different socio-institutional settings and cultural mores of the indi-
vidual countries or regions served. A careful examination of these new 
ventures confirmed the absence of charter-like operators, which specialize 
in transporting mass tourists to ‘sun-and-sea’ destinations.
Moreover, the pattern of initial market entry turns out to be relatively 
persistent over successive quarters. For instance, among the 135 carriers, 
only 25 (less than 20%) withdrew service in their second quarter of oper-
ation from any of the routes started in the first quarter, with the median 
number of routes withdrawn being exactly one. Similarly, only 21 carriers 
in their third quarter of operations withdrew service from any routes 
operated in the preceding quarter. Overall, these market withdrawals rep-
resent marginal fine-tuning of the route networks of these new ventures 
rather than largescale strategy reversals. In other words, the born- 
international carriers did not revert to becoming purely domestic carriers, 
or domestic ones to substantially international carriers, within the first 
few years from inception.
 Model
We model the international market entry decision-making of a de novo 
carrier in a two-step process: first we allow the carrier to decide whether 
or not to go international at birth, and then, conditional upon that deci-
sion, to choose the amount of capacity to allocate to the international 
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market. The econometric model is run such that the estimation for the 
two stages is conducted simultaneously. With this model, we are able to 
infer the decision-making process of new ventures from the observed 
results of those that choose not to go international at birth and those that 
choose to do so.
This model follows the procedure proposed by Heckman (1979). In 
the first stage, a discrete, probit model examines the factors that influence 
the decision for new ventures to go international at inception. For those 
choosing to do so, the extent of international entry at birth is examined 
with a linear regression in the second stage.
In the first stage of this model, we model the ‘go international’ decision 
by letting CrossBorderj be a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if 
the new venture j enters an international market at birth, and 0 other-
wise. Each new venture j then weighs the decision whether or not to go 
international at birth based on an unobserved index variable Cross- 
Border*j, which varies according to a vector of attributes wj and subject to 
stochastic error uj:
 
CrossBorder uj j j
∗ ′= +W γ
 
(5.1)
 
CrossBorder
CrossBorder
CrossBorder
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(5.2)
where γ is a vector of coefficients, and uj is the stochastic error.
For those firms going international at birth (CrossBorderj = 1), their 
average capacity (K ) allocated to international markets would depend 
on the observed demand and pre-existing market structure in the second 
stage of the model:
 
K CrossBorderj j= + =
′x β ε if 1
 
where xj is a matrix of observed market conditions and institutional fac-
tors, β is the corresponding vector of coefficients, and εj is the associated 
stochastic error.
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Assuming that uj and εj are jointly normally distributed with zero 
mean, standard deviations of 1 and σ respectively, and correlated by ρ, a 
maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) can be used to arrive at consis-
tent estimates for β (and w).
 Measures
For the dependent variable K , we take the natural logarithm of the aver-
age passenger capacity (in seats per week) allocated by each carrier to an 
international city-pair within the EU.  We use the logarithmic form 
because it places more emphasis for an equal magnitude of change when 
the underlying variable is small than when the underlying variable is large 
(i.e., small changes in a large market are not as likely to affect a new 
entrant’s decision as big changes in a small market).
Based on the hypotheses formulated earlier, we have three indepen-
dent variables (wj) to explain the initial CrossBorder decision (correspond-
ing to Hypotheses 1 and 2, respectively):
• HOMECTRYSIZE measures the geographic area of the home country 
market for air transport services facing the new venture. This is an 
approximate measure of opportunity cost in geographic terms of going 
international at inception. We observe that, in general, geographically 
expansive and sparsely populated countries have a more critical need 
for air transport than geographically concentrated and crowded coun-
tries (perhaps where established rail and road networks serve a similar 
purpose at lower cost). Hence we use the (logarithmic) land area of a 
new venture’s home country. For products with sales that do not have 
geographic dispersion implications, the total population count should 
suffice.
• CAPACITY measures the natural logarithm of the total inaugural 
capacity (seats per week) of the new venture. We use this measure as a 
proxy for start-up capital because all the ventures are private entities at 
birth and so no public information on available financial capital is 
available. Based on the relatively low marginal cost of operation (Caves, 
Christensen, & Tretheway, 1984), new carriers tend to maximize the 
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size of their inaugural networks, subject to the availability of financial 
resources. Hence the inaugural seats/week is a good proxy for the rela-
tive size of start-up financial capital and the production capacity at 
inception.
• HOMEBASESHR is the control variable that measures the size of the 
immediate home base of the new venture as a portion of its total 
domestic market. This helps standardize the different population den-
sities that may occur in different countries: new ventures founded in 
two cities with the same population and same home country size may 
still exhibit different propensities to internationalize early owing to 
different levels of ‘centrality’ of the two cities and hence their interna-
tional orientation. Here we use the ratio of the population of the city 
of the new venture’s operational headquarters (defined as the city with 
the most weekly departure seat capacity operated by the new carrier) 
to that of its entire home country. A high HOMEBASESHR value also 
means the lack of comparable urban agglomerations elsewhere within 
the home country to spread any fixed cost of production – thus mak-
ing other agglomerations beyond the home country attractive. We 
stress that population of a city is merely a proxy variable for the amount 
of economic activity represented by the city. We use the population 
statistics for the cities concerned, but recognize that airports serving a 
particular city also cater to larger catchment areas around it.
To investigate the average capacity allocated to each international city- 
pair market (K ), we use the following independent variables (xj):
• PASTDEMAND measures the effect of historically demonstrated 
demand of an existing market (city-pair). Here, we use a proxy vari-
able consisting of the natural logarithm of the aggregate weekly seat 
capacity operated by all carriers in the quarter prior to the new ven-
ture’s entry. For carriers operating in two or more markets, we use 
the sum of the competitors’ aggregate supply in each market weighted 
by the proportion of the new venture’s inaugural capacity serving 
that market. A previously unserved market is assumed to have zero 
PASTDEMAND.
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• NUMRIVAL measures the number of effective existing incumbents 
already serving a market. Here, we use the inverse of the Hirschmann–
Herfindahl Index (HHI) calculated on the weekly seat capacity sup-
plied by each incumbent. The HHI accounts for the uneven size of 
incumbents, giving more weight to large incumbents with the power 
to retaliate unilaterally. In other words, in a market with three opera-
tors, each with the same market share, the HHI is 3 × 1/32 = 1/3, 
which means that the effective number of incumbents is 3. For carriers 
operating in two or more markets, we use the inverse HHI for each 
market weighted by the proportion of the new venture’s inaugural 
capacity serving that market.
• NUMRIVAL2 measures the potential non-linearity of NUMRIVAL, 
which is simply the quadratic (squared) term of NUMRIVAL. This 
treatment is consistent with Haveman (1993). We make the same 
adjustment for NUMRIVAL2 as we do for NUMRIVAL for carriers 
operating in two or more markets.
While the concept of cultural distance is understood by the international 
business research community, the normative implications of formal mea-
sures of cultural distance on a firm’s strategy, along with its proposed 
refinements (see Brett & Okumura, 1998; Brouthers & Brouthers, 2001) 
have been relatively mixed (Tihanyi, Griffith, & Russell, 2005). In par-
ticular, the lack of a consistent directional influence on entry mode choice 
(e.g., Barkema, Bell, & Pennings, 1996; Erramilli, Agarwal, & Kim, 
1997), survival and performance (e.g., Luo & Peng, 1999; Morosini, 
Shane, & Singh, 1998; Park & Ungson, 1997) has been a source of con-
cern for researchers.13
As a result of the ongoing ambiguity in implementing cultural distance 
as it applies to international new ventures, and because this is not the 
theoretical focus of this paper, we choose to implement this construct via 
a simple, intuitive measure  – whether or not two countries share a 
 common linguistic heritage. We make a distinction between the opera-
tional language (i.e., the lingua franca of business) of a particular indus-
try, which is often English when individuals from different language 
groupings have to communicate, and the linguistic heritage of a particular 
region (where the customers are), which is often reflected in the official 
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native language(s). In the latter, we refer to the language that individuals 
from the same region default to when they have to communicate with 
each other, and the common language used in government documents 
and official communication. Linguistic anthropologists have known for 
some time that regions with linguistic commonalities share the ways in 
which social organizations are constructed (e.g., Duranti et  al., 2003; 
Ochs & Schieffelin, 1984; Silverstein, 2004). For instance, the legal sys-
tems of English-speaking countries around the world are more similar to 
each another than to French-speaking ones; the academic system of 
university- preparatory ‘gymnasia’ is more likely to be found in German- 
speaking countries such as Austria and Switzerland. In other words, lin-
guistic commonality often points to other similarities in the social 
organizations of the regions, and these in turn correlate with specific cul-
tural mores and norms.
By focussing on linguistic heritage, we allow triangulated relationships 
not possible in the conventional measures of cultural distance. For 
instance, we consider the Flemish-speaking part of Belgium and the 
Netherlands to be in the same linguistic zone, in the same manner that 
the French-speaking part of Belgium and France are in the same zone. We 
treat Germany and Austria as one linguistic zone, as the two countries 
share the same written form of the German language. While we acknowl-
edge that the use of linguistic heritage is a coarse proxy for the underlying 
cultural and social institutions of a region, it is arguably the single most 
appropriate measure given the limited degrees of freedom afforded by our 
relatively small sample. To this end, we use this variable to indicate 
whether two markets are culturally similar or not:
• LANGUAGE measures the differences in linguistic heritage between 
the home country of a new venture and its international EU market. 
This measure minimizes computational complexity and hence poten-
tial measurement error (Mezias et  al., 2002). We simply indicate 
whether an international market has the same linguistic heritage as the 
new venture’s home country (LANGUAGE=1 if this statement is true, 
and 0 otherwise). By linguistic heritage we mean there is a commonal-
ity in the official native language(s) of the respective countries. For 
carriers operating in two or more markets, we use LANGUAGE on 
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each market weighted by the proportion of the new venture’s inaugu-
ral capacity serving that city-pair market, and then sum that number 
across all markets served by the carrier (LANGUAGE=1 if all its inter-
national citypair markets straddle countries that speak the same official 
languages). We interact LANGUAGE with PASTDEMAND, 
NUMRIVAL and NUMRIVAL2 to investigate the impact of culture 
on the international capacity allocation decisions of the new 
ventures.
As for the possible impact of fixed effects, we originally included dummy 
variables for year and country effects, but because these turned out to be 
statistically insignificant we dropped the variables from further analyses 
in order to preserve degrees of freedom for our model. With our relatively 
small sample size, these variables consumed valuable parameter space in 
the regression analysis, and hence are not included in the models dis-
cussed in this paper. We kept one control for K : the natural logarithm of 
the city population (CITYPOP) of the operational headquarters of the 
new venture, since we anticipate that (given everything else constant) the 
larger a new carrier’s immediate home market, the more internationally 
oriented the city may be and the more likely it will be to allocate capacity 
to the international market, given that it chooses to ‘go international’. 
Table  5.2 shows the Pearson’s correlation matrix for the independent 
variables.
To check for multicollinearity, we rely on the variance inflation factor 
(VIF), which is the number of times the variance of the estimated coef-
ficients would be increased compared with the hypothetical case where 
there was no correlation among the variables (Neter, Wasserman, & 
Kutner, 1985). The VIFs would be 1 if there was no correlation, and 
values of VIF exceeding 10 are often considered to be indicative of mul-
ticollinearity. For both the discrete and linear stages of our econometric 
model, the highest VIF in the probit stage is only 2.1, and in the linear 
stage it is only 1.3  in the absence of the interaction variables. The 
 maximum VIF for the entire model, excluding NUMRIVAL2 and 
LANGUAGE NUMRIVAL2 is 7.8, showing that the effect of multicol-
linearity is not a serious concern (the source of the high VIF was between 
PASTDEMAND and LANGUAGE PASTDEMAND). The NUMRIVAL2 
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variable by construction correlates highly with NUMRIVAL (its square 
root). However, removing the NUMRIVAL2 and LANGUAGE 
NUMRIVAL2 variables from the analysis does not significantly change 
the results of the analysis. We show the results for both including and 
excluding the NUMRIVAL2 and LANGUAGE NUMRIVAL2 variables.
 Results
Three two-stage regression models based on Heckman (1979) were used 
to test our hypotheses. In addition, we report two one-stage models, one 
modelling only the probit stage of the two-stage models, and the other 
modelling only the linear stage, for robustness testing. Table 5.3 shows 
the coefficient estimates and standard errors of these models.
Model 1 in Table 5.3 includes only Eqs. (5.1) and (5.2), that is, the 
probit portion (first stage) of the two-stage model. The estimates need to 
be interpreted with caution because of its one-stage nature. Nevertheless, 
it can be observed that HOMECTRYSIZE bears the expected negative 
sign and is statistically significant (P < 0.01), meaning that the larger the 
size of the home market, the less likely it is that a new venture will be 
‘born-global’. CAPACITY has the expected positive sign but is not statis-
tically significant. HOMEBASESHR has a positive effect and is signifi-
cant (P < 0.10) but, as discussed earlier, its ultimate directional effect 
depends on the geography around the home city of the new venture.
Model 2  in Table  5.3 shows the result of the two-stage model that 
includes only the control variables (HOMEBASESHR in the probit stage 
and CITYPOP in the linear stage). As expected, CITYPOP shows a posi-
tive sign (i.e., a larger home city market encourages a new venture to 
allocate more capacity to international markets once it is ‘born-global’) 
and is statistically significant (P < 0.01). The coefficient for 
HOMEBASESHR is still positive statistically significant (P < 0.01).
Model 3 in Table 5.3 includes back the variables HOMECTRYSIZE 
and CAPACITY in the probit (first) stage of the regression, and shows 
that both variables are now statistically significant (P < 0.01) while retain-
ing the same signs as in Model 1. In other words, Hypothesis 1 (that new 
ventures are more likely to be ‘born-global’ from a small country than 
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from a large one) and Hypothesis 2 (that larger initial production capaci-
ties increase the probability of a ‘born-global’) are confirmed. The log- 
likelihood of Model 3 is also significantly (P < 0.01) different from that 
of Model 2, which in turn is significantly different from that of Model 1 
(P < 0.01). Interestingly, the coefficient for HOMEBASESHR at the pro-
bit stage is now negative and not significant.
In Model 4, two more variables – PASTDEMAND and NUMRIVAL – 
are included in the linear (second) stage of the regression, but the qua-
dratic term NUMRIVAL2 is omitted. The coefficient for NUMRIVAL is 
statistically significant (P < 0.10) and of the expected negative sign – con-
firming Hypothesis 4a – but the coefficient for PASTDEMAND is not. 
Based on the log-likelihoods, Model 4 is not significantly different from 
Model 3 (P < 0.368).
In Model 5, the result of the two-stage model with all the variables, 
including the quadratic term NUMRIVAL2 but excluding the effect of 
LANGUAGE, is reported. The log-likelihood of this model is signifi-
cantly different (P < 0.01) from that of Model 2 (with only the control 
variables) after taking into consideration the additional variables. 
However, it is just outside the criterion for weak significance from Model 
3 (P < 0.136), possibly because of the low number of observations (only 
67 out of the 135 carriers can be relied upon for the linear stage of the 
regression). Nevertheless, the estimated coefficients for all the new vari-
ables added since Model 3 (PASTDEMAND, NUMRIVAL and 
NUMRIVAL2) are statistically significant (P < 0.01), and the overall 
regression has a better fit than Model 4 (without the quadratic term 
NUMRIVAL2) based on the difference in log-likelihoods from Model 3. 
In other words, Model 5 confirms the quadratic effect of NUMRIVAL2 – 
but the signs of NUMRIVAL and NUMRIVAL2 are the opposite of those 
expected in Hypothesis 4b. Considering that NUMRIVAL is usually 
between 1 and 5 for the intra-European air transport market, the overall 
influence of the increasing number of incumbents on the capacity 
 introduced to the market by the new venture is still negative. In other 
words, international new ventures cautiously reduce the capacity allo-
cated to highly competitive markets when compared with less competi-
tive ones. This shows that the impact of increased competition dominates 
that of isomorphic mimetic entry on capacity allocation, confirming 
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Hypothesis 4a and not 4b. Moreover, the estimated coefficient of 
PASTDEMAND is positive and significant, confirming Hypothesis 3.
In Model 6, the primary effect of the LANGUAGE variable is added by 
itself. The LANGUAGE variable by itself is not significant, as its interac-
tive effects with PASTDEMAND and NUMRIVAL are potentially offset-
ting each other (PASTDEMAND has a positive effect on international 
capacity allocation, whereas NUMRIVAL has a negative one). Model 6 in 
fact has a worse fit (P < 0.493) than Model 5 (P < 0.136) when compared 
with Model 3 (or similarly with Model 2).
In Model 7, the primary effect of LANGUAGE is removed, and 
instead its interaction effects with PASTDEMAND, NUMRIVAL and 
NUMRIVAL2 are included. The log-likelihood of Model 7 is not signifi-
cantly different from Model 5 without the interaction terms (probably 
because of the even smaller sample size with the interaction effect), but 
is still statistically different from Model 2 with only the control variables 
(P < 0.01).
By implicitly separating those countries with low cultural/institutional 
similarities, the LANGUAGE interactions in Model 7 reveal some inter-
esting decisions made by the new ventures. Compared with the general 
economic effect in Model 5, the coefficients of PASTDEMAND and 
NUMRIVAL still bear the expected signs and are statistically significant 
(P < 0.01). The coefficient of NUMRIVAL2, however, is no longer signifi-
cant. The LANGUAGE-interacted terms, however, show a different pat-
tern of market entry. First, the coefficient of LANGUAGE × NUMRIVAL 
is strongly positive in magnitude and statistically significant (P < 0.01), 
whereas that of LANGUAGE × NUMRIVAL2 is negative but statistically 
insignificant (the same is true for the sum of the coefficients of 
LANGUAGE × NUMRIVAL and NUMRIVAL, etc.). This result bears 
only a passing resemblance to the quadratic relationship hypothesized by 
Haveman (1993), as the quadratic term has a small coefficient and is not 
statistically significant. Second, the coefficient of LANGUAGE × 
PASTDEMAND is negative and statistically significant (P < 0.01), sug-
gesting that these new ventures are disproportionately allocating less 
capacity to larger markets that are culturally similar to their home coun-
try. This may indicate that the new carriers simply want to be ‘present’ in 
large existing markets, perhaps in search of legitimacy.
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In comparison, new ventures in their quest to boost their legitimacy 
behave differently in linguistically similar vs linguistically different mar-
kets. In culturally similar markets (i.e., interacted with the LANGUAGE 
variable), new ventures allocate more capacity (confirming Hypothesis 
4b) as the number of established competitors increases (in a mimetic, 
isomorphic manner). In linguistically different markets (i.e., not inter-
acted with LANGUAGE), the capacity allocated declines with each 
incremental competitor (confirming Hypothesis 4a). In other words, 
market entry behaviour appears to be more cautious as the number of 
competitors increases in markets with no linguistic similarity (consis-
tent with Hypotheses 5a and 5b). This demonstrates the twin chal-
lenges of new ventures in dealing with economic and social legitimacy 
costs of entry.
The coefficients estimated in Model 7 can be illustrated in graphical 
terms. Figure 5.1 shows the probability of new ventures going interna-
tional at inception for a small number of representative countries based 
on geographical area (corresponding to the HOMECTRYSIZE variable, 
using countryaverage parameters for the other variables). The gradually 
declining probability of firms being ‘born-global’ as the country size 
increases demonstrates the fundamental influence of economic geogra-
phy. Figure 5.2 shows how much capacity will be allocated to an estab-
lished international market by a ‘born-global’ firm as a function of the 
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number of incumbents. Clearly, the new entrants behave differently in 
markets linking two countries sharing a linguistic heritage than in mar-
kets that do not.
Model 8 in Table 5.3 is the same as Model 7 except for the exclusion 
of NUMRIVAL2 and LANGUAGE × NUMRIVAL2 (these correlate 
highly with NUMRIVAL and LANGUAGE × NUMRIVAL by construc-
tion). The two models show qualitatively similar results.
Model 9 in Table 5.3 is a robustness check of the two-stage selection 
approach we used in the analysis. It shows how inconsistent the coeffi-
cient estimates of a simple ordinary least-square regression would be had 
we simply included in our sample only those new carriers that entered 
international markets at inception and excluded the rest of the carriers 
that chose to remain domestic (i.e., skewed results would be obtained if 
one started from a censored sample).
 Discussion
In this paper we focus on the pattern of inaugural international market 
entry of new ventures, and show that these firms need not be a distinct 
breed as far as socio-economic and cultural influences are concerned. We 
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demonstrate that the decision to be ‘born-global’ is influenced by the size 
of the home market of the new venture and by its inaugural production 
capacity, as well as by economic forces (e.g., level of competition) that 
also influence other firms that stage their international entry decisions. If 
an international new venture relies on the general populace for its busi-
ness, it too would be subject to the same cultural and socio-institutional 
influences as its more traditional counterparts. Further, we demonstrate 
that the decision to internationalize or not should be considered jointly 
with the decision on capacity allocation to international markets, as ana-
lysing these separately may lead to biased results.
The implication of our work for the theory and practice of born-global 
firms is threefold. First, the next generation of research on ‘born-globals’ 
should focus less on merely confirming the existence of such firms and 
more on the economic and non-economic context in which their early 
internationalization decisions are made. In addition, scholars should, if 
possible, include non-born-global firms that had similar characteristics as 
the born-globals at inception but chose not to internationalize early in 
their sample, or at least other alternative market expansion plans that 
were considered by the focal firms. The early internationalization deci-
sion is not necessarily the only choice for such firms, contrary to conjec-
tures from the extant literature. Our study suggests that there may exist 
other potential ‘born-globals’ that ultimately choose to concentrate on 
their domestic markets first (and still become successful).
Second, the culture-defying characters of born-globals should be 
down-played. As demonstrated in this paper (and also in some previous 
papers), as long as the products (or services) of the born-global firms rely 
on the general populace for support, cultural distance will still have an 
appreciable difference in, say, the allocation of production capacities for 
different markets. In other words, the influence of cultural distance does 
not just vanish into thin air for born-globals. Instead of merely touting 
how the staged-internationalization model may be outdated, scholars can 
focus on how the influences described there can still apply in the world 
of international new ventures. For products that appeal to customers 
with specialized knowledge, we emphasize that the ‘domain-specific 
familiarity’ is at work simultaneously with, and does not entirely elimi-
nate, the impact of cultural distance.
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Third, early internationalization is not an elixir for all firms. We dem-
onstrate how early internationalization could be a logical, profit- 
maximizing decision for some firms (e.g., the born-globals), and that 
even for these firms culture has an impact on their production decisions. 
In other words, the mere existence of born-globals does not mean that 
they are necessarily more successful than others. It would be equally 
interesting, if not less insightful, to focus on the extent to which such 
international new ventures survive or surpass their domestic counterparts 
over a prolonged period of time. If indeed the economic underpinnings 
of these international ventures lie in the geographical mispricing of 
resources, then moderate fluctuations in input prices, currency exchange 
and interest rates, as well as small shifts in demand, may be sufficient to 
unravel such opportunities. We surmise that a longer-term perspective as 
to how international new ventures adjust to environmental disruptions 
would be tremendously insightful in the next series of papers on 
born-globals.
So far, we have side-stepped the possibility that the very assemblage of 
resources for the production of goods or services can take place in more 
than one country: either the home country for domestically oriented 
new ventures, or a foreign country in the case of international new ven-
tures. In the words of Oviatt and McDougall (1994), and McDougall 
et al. (1994) the value chain of activities of international new ventures 
can span over few or many countries. While we recognize that this per-
spective is somewhat difficult to generalize, it is reasonable to argue that 
every production process requires a different set of raw materials and 
human talent, and the variation in price of inputs from different geo-
graphical locations, combined with inexpensive and reliable transport 
and communication links across great distances, enables transnational 
value creation at inception to be viable. For instance, the British 
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) has documented the viability of trans-
porting semi- manufactured socks from the US to West Africa for pro-
cessing and then back to the US for sale as finished products (Saky-Addo, 
2003). While such opportunities exist, they require a high level of trust 
among value network partners as well as a high level of inter-organiza-
tional coordination that may be beyond the reach of relatively resource-
poor new ventures. Effectively, the need for specialized resources that 
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may be agglomerated at spatially distinct geographic locations may 
indeed necessitate new ventures initiating such international value net-
works at birth, but once a production value chain is established (e.g., 
when a start-up airline is organized and certified for operations) the con-
sideration as to which market to export such services should broadly 
follow the model outlined in this paper.
 Conclusion
In this paper we examine the pattern of inaugural international market 
entry of new ventures, and show that such firms need not be as distinct 
as previous research has portrayed them. In particular, the decision for a 
new venture to internationalize at inception is influenced by the size of its 
home market and by its production capacity, as well as by the economic 
forces that influence other more traditional, staged-internationalizing 
firms. Additionally, we show that the cultural similarity of the home mar-
ket relative (as implemented through linguistic similarity) to an interna-
tional market has an impact on the inaugural capacity allocated to those 
international markets even as the number of competitors increases. Most 
importantly, we demonstrate that the decision to internationalize or not 
should be considered jointly with the capacity allocation decision to 
international markets, as analysing these separately may lead to biased 
results. Finally, because our analysis is based on a sample of firms that 
trade in a product sold to the general public, not products that embody 
specialized knowledge, we believe it represents a more robust test of the 
international new venture conjecture.
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Notes
1. An implicit assumption we make is that the products of the new venture 
under investigation exhibit non-increasing marginal cost of production.
2. The increasing prevalence of domain-specific knowledge in the interna-
tional business arena would therefore make the traditional notion of cul-
tural distance appear less relevant (e.g., Bell, 1995).
3. This assumes that large population centres translate into large potential 
markets.
4. This assumes that the unit revenue derived from selling the product else-
where within the country and/or neighbouring countries is similar, sug-
gesting a fairly homogeneous product.
5. The mimetic effect will be greater for firms that are similar in size. 
However, for de novo new ventures, this size-relatedness is less relevant as 
their incumbents are often many times larger their size.
6. Haveman (1993) estimated the inverted-U shape relationship based on 
entry rates. Our study deals with the pattern of market entry, and is 
hence subtly different from her hypothesis.
7. Or, at least, similar technologies should be available to all firms – incum-
bents and new entrants alike.
8. There are international gateway cities such as London and Frankfurt am 
Main, but passengers flying between, say, Lisbon and Copenhagen can 
probably enjoy non-stop service instead of having to connect via London 
or Frankfurt.
9. A class of regional carrier exists in the EU with close operational and 
often financial ties to traditional flagcarriers (e.g., Crossair Europe/
Europe Continental Airways was intended to be an EU arm of Crossair). 
We exclude these from our definition of independent, new entrants. We 
include, however, those carriers that operated as entities independent 
from their parent corporations, such as Go (initiated by British Airways) 
and Germanwings (by Eurowings-Lufthansa). Taking out the few inde-
pendent offshoots of established carriers (such as Go and Germanwings) 
from the sample does not significantly change the result of the analysis.
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10. Since all the new carriers in our study face the same operational con-
straints at busy airports, the presence of this constraint does not place 
undue pressure for one carrier to internationalize at inception compared 
with another.
11. Some new entrants positioned themselves to offer better service than the 
traditional flag-carriers.
12. For instance, full-service carriers Swiss and Austrian Airlines at one point 
eliminated complimentary meal service in their intra-European opera-
tions and offered refreshments for sale in flight, resembling the offering 
of some of the budget carriers.
13. Some, including Hofstede, Neuijen, Ohayv, and Sanders (1990) and 
Mezias et al. (2002), suggest that culture at the national and organiza-
tional levels are different constructs entirely.
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